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Quid-pro-quo exchanges of outside
director deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans for
equity-based compensation
CYNTHIA J. CAMPBELL, MARK L. POWER*, and ROGER D. STOVER
& AQ1
Abstract
The independence of outside directors is critical to corporate board eﬀectiveness. We examine a
unique period in corporate governance when outside directors’ deﬁned beneﬁt pensions are
replaced with increases in equity. Firms with pension plans signiﬁcantly underperform their
industry in terms of stock returns. Firms terminating the pension plans in exchange for equity
have signiﬁcant increases in stock returns relative to their industry subsequent to the change.
All samples outperform the ROA and ROE industry medians both before and after the
change in compensation, indicating pressure from organized investors likely comes from stock
performance, not accounting performance. Investor rights pressure and outside director com-
pensation and not takeover risk or institutional ownership best explain ﬁrms altering outside
director compensation, with board of director eﬀectiveness improving.
1 Introduction
Issues of corporate governance and speciﬁcally the independence of the board
through the roles of outside directors have increased substantially in the wake of
corporate scandals. The relevance and importance of the independence of outside
directors is heightened following the collapse of Enron, Worldcom, and the Grasso
pay scandal, among others. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) ﬁnd that independent
directors with ﬁnancial expertise are valuable in providing oversight of a ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancial reporting practices. Both major exchanges, NASDAQ and NYSE, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have issued new standards to make
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outside directors’ role more signiﬁcant in the ﬁrm’s governance structure. We exam-
ine linkages between outside inﬂuences, outside director compensation and board
eﬀectiveness by focusing on a speciﬁc change in corporate governance. In particular,
we examine a sample of ﬁrms with boards electing to replace outside directors’
deﬁned beneﬁt pensions with increases in equity compensation. Corporations began
to widely sponsor outside director deﬁned beneﬁt plans in the mid to late 1980s,
but these plans have nearly vanished following a period of intense public criticism
from institutional investors, Investors’ Rights Association of America (IRAA), and
the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD).1 Empirical analysis of
the decision to change the form of compensation for outside directors is relevant
to the board’s independence and monitoring eﬀectiveness. Examining variables
relating to causes of this replacement decision, including stock return and accounting
performance, provides insight into the roles of institutional investors, investor rights
groups, and takeover activity in corporate board governance and eﬀectiveness.
While the issues of eﬀective corporate governance continue to be debated, the
importance of outside directors to ﬁrm valuation has long been discussed. Fama
(1980), and Fama and Jensen (1983a, b) premise that outside directors value their
reputation and uniquely inﬂuence corporate governance by monitoring management,
limiting managerial discretion, and lowering contracting costs between shareholders
and management. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the form of director
compensation inﬂuences how objective outside directors may be when evaluating
whether management proposals are in the best interests of stockholders. Others
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1997; Noe and Robello, 1996) acknowledge the role of
incentive compensation for directors to eﬀectively monitor management activity.
However, as noted by Jensen and Warner (1988), while share ownership should
provide the correct incentive for both managers and directors, the precise eﬀects
are not well understood. Perry (1998) ﬁnds that directors’ incentive compensation
of independently oriented boards increases the probability of dismissal of chief
executive oﬃcers of poorly performing ﬁrms than counterparts in a control sample.
Mork, TQ1Schliefer, and Vishny (1988) ﬁnd that outside directors can become ineﬀective
monitors at certain levels of ownership. This misalignment of incentives is voided at
higher levels of ownership and the interests of outside directors and stockholders
become realigned.
Other studies test whether the composition of the board could be central to its
inﬂuence and have an impact on shareholder value. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990)
ﬁnd positive investor reactions to appointments of outside directors. Weisbach (1988)
examines 495 companies between 1977 and 1980 and concludes that ﬁrms with
outsider dominated boards are more likely to be activist, increasing the likelihood of
top management being removed by the board. Byrd and Hickman (1992) ﬁnd similar
evidence of outside director inﬂuence when examining tender oﬀers during the period
of 1980–1987. They conclude that acquisition announcement date returns are
1 The Wall Street Journal article, dated 3/9/2000 on page A1, reports on a study conducted by Pearl Meyer
& Partners, a New York compensation ﬁrm. This survey of the 1999 proxies for a random sample of
companies found that deﬁned beneﬁt pensions had ‘nearly vanished from packages due to criticism from
investors who prefer directors to own their own equity stakes’.
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signiﬁcantly less negative when a majority of the bidding ﬁrm’s board are indepen-
dent outsiders. Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1994) AQ2ﬁnd a target’s tender oﬀer
premium is higher the more additional directorships outside directors have. Finally,
Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994) observe a positive stock market reaction to the
adoption of a poison pill takeover defense only when a majority of the directors
are outsiders.
Subsequent studies (i.e., Denis and Serrano, 1996) suggest board eﬀectiveness has
become less signiﬁcant in the context of a growing role of external inﬂuences such as
corporate control and increased institutionalization of company equity holdings.
Denis and Serrano (1996) study a sample of ﬁrms that experience unsuccessful
corporate control contests in the latter 1990s. Their general conclusion is that outside
investors who purchase the stock following the failed corporate control event cause
most of the subsequent management turnover. The results of Mikkelson and Partch
(1997) conﬁrm the general interpretations of Denis and Serrano (1996). They ﬁnd
management turnover is greatest during a period of active takeovers and signiﬁcantly
less during a period of low takeover activity. In contrast, Huson, Parrino, and Starks
(2001) ﬁnd that, despite the decline in takeover activity in the late 1980s, the
frequency of forced management turnover and outside executive succession increase
in the 1990s. They conclude that internal monitoring mechanisms are not less eﬀec-
tive when the takeover activity declines. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) divide the
takeover threat into competitive and risk components. As a result of the external
corporate control risk component, management would likely demand higher
compensation to reﬂect the takeover threat. Their results indicate that the external
corporate control risk aﬀects management decision making regardless of the ﬁrm’s
governance policy.
While there are several studies on the disciplining of top management, there is
little empirical research on the disciplining of outside directors. Gilson (1990) ﬁnds
outside directors in failing ﬁrms have one-third fewer directorships after departure
from the board and Kaplan and Reishus (1990) ﬁnd outside directors are less likely
to obtain additional outside directorships when the ﬁrm’s board on which they sit
decreases dividends. Recent studies relating to corporate governance variables focus
on the importance of various attributes of corporate governance and the impact
on ﬁrm value. Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) ﬁnd that boards with better governance
have a higher Q-ratio, reﬂecting greater value. Brown and Caylor (2004) ﬁnd in
their composite measures of corporate governance that executive and director com-
pensation are the most important attributes of governance with respect to corporate
performance.
If the arguments of institutional investors and investor rights groups are correct,
ﬁrms with deﬁned beneﬁt pensions for outside directors should underperform, have
characteristics of poor governance, and face greater outside pressure. Additionally,
outside director independence should increase as a result of the quid-pro-quo
exchange of deﬁned beneﬁt retirement plans for equity, their interests should be
more closely aligned with shareholders, and ﬁrm performance should measurably
improve, ex post. Our results provide support for the monitoring hypothesis in
which the change in outside director compensation is consistent with an increase
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in board eﬀectiveness and ﬁrm performance. Similar to reports in the popular press,
we ﬁnd that this shift in compensation is most aﬀected by external investment
community pressure and internal governance variables. We ﬁnd ﬁrms with pension
plans underperform their industries as measured by stock returns, but not accounting
measures of performance. Firms terminating pension plans with the resulting
increased equity compensation for outside directors enhance board of director
monitoring eﬀectiveness as measured by stock return performance. Using a logistic
regression model, we ﬁnd investor rights pressure and governance variables and
not takeover risk or institutional ownership best explain the choice of ﬁrms to alter
outside director compensation. More importantly, these variables also signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence ﬁrms’ decisions to replace deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans with increases in
equity-based compensation for outside directors. While there is evidence that ﬁrms
terminating outside director pension plans improve stock return performance relative
to their industries, termination of the plan may also have the added beneﬁts of
investor relations, good will, and appearance.
2 Background on director compensation
The role of director compensation has received attention as compensation evolved
from a $20 gold coin in the early 1900s to include employee-type beneﬁts and
incentives in the 1980s and 1990s (Vafeas, 1999 and Carey, Elson, and England,
1996). Jensen and Meckling (1976) were the ﬁrst to formally conclude that the form
of director compensation inﬂuences how objective outside directors may be when
evaluating whether management proposals are in the best interests of stockholders.
Models of the ﬁrm (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1997; Noe and Robello, 1996)
acknowledge this role of incentive compensation for directors to eﬀectively monitor
management activity. Perry (1998) ﬁnds incentive compensation for directors of
independently oriented boards increases the likelihood that chief executive oﬃcers
of ﬁrms that perform poorly will more likely be dismissed than their counterparts
in a control sample. Fich and Shivdasani (2004) ﬁnd stock option plans for out-
side directors do help align the incentives of outside directors and shareholders,
improving ﬁrm value.
Pension plans are used by organizations to recruit, retain, and retire employees.
A particularly attractive pension plan option rewarding long service is the deﬁned
beneﬁt pension plan. During the mid- to late-1980s, a number of corporations began
sponsoring deﬁned beneﬁt plans for outside directors. Several theories exist about
the widespread adoption of pension plans for outside directors. Human resources
theory would state that the plans were adopted as part of the overall compensation
package to attract and retain outside directors in a competitive environment for
director services. A related theory would be that outside director retainer fees were
relatively ﬂat during the 1980s and increasing the indirect (beneﬁt) part of total
compensation was a less obvious way of increasing compensation than increasing
the dollar value of retainer and meeting fees. Directors could have also been trying
to expropriate shareholder wealth, since the present value of this form of deferred
compensation can be quite high. The theory that is most commonly argued by
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investors when calling for the termination of outside director deﬁned beneﬁt pensions
is that such plans are an attempt by management to buy the loyalty of directors.
Various institutional investors, Investors’ Rights Association of America (IRAA),
and the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD), among others,
became highly critical of the practice of using deﬁned beneﬁt pensions as part of
outside directors’ compensation. The argument is that deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans
have the pernicious eﬀect of compromising outside director independence and
impartiality because such compensation is used by management to ensure their
loyalty and agreement with management initiatives. Diﬀerent groups publicly called
for replacement of pension plans for outside directors with performance-based
compensation to make companies more responsive to shareholder interests and
improve ﬁrm performance. Subsequently, many pensions were replaced with larger
equity stakes to ostensibly better align the outside directors’ interests with those
of shareholders.2 By investigating this decision by a sample of ﬁrms, we are able
to further decipher the role of external monitoring inﬂuences on the eﬀectiveness of
boards of directors’ monitoring and to determine if the change in compensation
structure is value adding.3
A review of the proxy statements of the sample used in this study show that outside
director compensation includes cash, equity, and other beneﬁts. The cash component
of non-employee director compensation usually includes an annual retainer for
serving on the board and meeting fees. Most corporations in our sample allow
directors to voluntarily defer the cash portion of their compensation. Equity owner-
ship plans include paying all or part of the annual fee in equity, a stock ownership
requirement, grants of restricted or unrestricted stock and stock options. The last
category of compensation is other beneﬁts. A popular form of other beneﬁts is
outside director retirement plans. Directors’ retirement plans are exclusively deﬁned
beneﬁt plans that typically have an age (65) and years of service (10) requirement
for beneﬁt accrual and payment. The deﬁned beneﬁt is usually a percentage of the
annual retainer up to 100%. Beneﬁt duration is typically a stated number of years,
but some companies provided a lifetime beneﬁt to qualifying directors. In most cases,
a beneﬁciary (spouse) can be designated to receive the beneﬁt for a period certain.
In addition to retirement plans, other beneﬁts included medical expense plans, life
2 The proxy statement of one of the ﬁrms that has a quid-pro-quo exchange states the retainer plan and the
amended pension plan replaces the existing plan with the annual grant of 250 shares of stock and the
termination of future beneﬁts under the pension plan. The proxy goes on to state, ‘These changes are
designed to increase generally the portion of non-employee Director compensation that is equity-based,
thereby aligning the Directors’ interests more closely with those of the Share Owners. ’
3 Several earlier studies test whether composition of the board could be central to the board’s inﬂuence and
have an impact on shareholder value. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) ﬁnd a positive stock market reaction
to appointments of outside directors. Weisbach (1988) examines 495 companies between 1977 and 1980
and concludes that ﬁrms with outsider-dominated boards are more likely to be activist, increasing the
likelihood of top management being removed by the board. Byrd and Hickman (1992) ﬁnd similar
evidence of outside director inﬂuence when examining tender oﬀers during the period of 1980–1987. They
conclude that acquisition announcement date returns are signiﬁcantly less negative when a majority of
the bidding ﬁrm’s board is independent outsiders. Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) ﬁnd a target’s
tender oﬀer premium is higher the more additional directorships outside directors have. Brickley, Coles,
and Terry (1994) observe a positive stock market reaction to the adoption of a poison pill takeover
defense only when a majority of the directors are outsiders.
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insurance, services, matching donation programs to charities, and director legacy
donations.
The NACD (1995) studied director compensation and, as a result, two principles
of director compensation were developed.4 First, directors should be compensated in
a manner that aligns their interests with those of the shareholders they represent.
Second, directors’ compensation packages should be value adding from the per-
spective of both the director and corporation. An issue addressed in this paper is the
use of deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans as a component of compensation for outside
directors. Deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans reward time and service and consequently
may erode outside directors’ independence, causing them to align themselves more
with management than with shareholders. Following the NACD (1995) Report,
many ﬁrms began terminating their outside director deﬁned beneﬁt pensions and
replacing them with equity-based compensation to meet individual and institutional
investor demands to create more independent boards of directors and ensure that
the boards focus on creating shareholder value. Perusal of the proxy statements of
companies targeted by investor groups in our sample show that director indepen-
dence and a lack of performance-based compensation are the usual reasons given
in the shareholder resolutions that called for the termination of deﬁned beneﬁt
retirement plans for outside directors. Many targeted ﬁrms’ board of directors
initially did not support the shareholder resolutions calling for the termination of
the retirement plan. The typical reason given for opposition was that the pension
component of total compensation was necessary to attract and retain qualiﬁed
non-employee directors. Firms terminating the plans reasoned that deﬁned beneﬁt
pension plans act as deferred cash compensation and do not suﬃciently align the
interests of directors with shareholders. We provide evidence on the determinants of
outside director compensation, how governance characteristics aﬀect the structure
of outside directors’ compensation, and whether equity-based plans better align the
incentives of outside directors with shareholders.
3 Sample
The initial list of ﬁrms for our study was obtained from a large international
consulting organization. The organization followed 200 large well-established ﬁrms
and provided us with a report identifying companies according to ﬁrms’ outside
director retirement plans during the 1995–1996 proxy season.5 This proxy season is
4 NACD (1995) ‘ ‘‘Best Practices’’ are as follows: (a) Establish a process by which directors can determine
the compensation program in a deliberative and objective way (b) Set a substantial target for stock
ownership by each director and a time period during which this target is to be met. (c) Deﬁne the desirable
total value of all forms of director compensation. (d) Pay directors solely in the form of equity and
cash – with equity representing a substantial portion of the total up to 100 percent; dismantle existing
beneﬁt programs and avoid creating new ones. (e) Adopt a policy stating that a company should not hire
a director or a director’s ﬁrm to provide professional or ﬁnancial services to the corporation. (f) Disclose
fully in the proxy statement the philosophy and process used in determining director compensation and
the value of all elements of compensation. ’
5 Six proxy mailings and stockholder meetings are in 1995. Of the ﬁnal sample of 169, 93.49% of the
proxies are mailed during February through April of 1996 with corresponding stockholders’ meetings
taking place during February through June of 1996. Five proxies are mailed later in 1996 with one
stockholder meeting occurring in January of 1997.
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of particular importance because the practice of compensating outside directors
with deﬁned beneﬁt pensions that developed in the 1980s had become a signiﬁcant
corporate governance issue and was receiving a great deal of media and investor
attention. As a consequence, by 1999 almost all large publicly traded ﬁrms had
terminated deﬁned beneﬁt pensions for outside directors, including every ﬁrm in our
sample. The ﬁnal sample used in our study was developed as follows. Six ﬁrms are
dropped because of signiﬁcant confounding events (e.g. bankruptcy) or the ﬁrm’s
proxies are not available from the SEC’s EDGAR database. Financial institutions
are dropped because they are regulated resulting in a sample size of 169. Within this
sample, 45 ﬁrms did not compensate outside directors with a deﬁned beneﬁt pension,
while 124 ﬁrms did.
To study the decision to retain or terminate the pension plan, we further restrict
these ﬁrms to having a quid-pro-quo exchange of outside directors’ deﬁned beneﬁt
pension plans for equity-based compensation and ﬁrms that did not simultaneously
alter top executive incentive plans during the proxy season. These restrictions are
imposed upon the subset of ﬁrms with pension plans to allow for a more precise test
of whether equity-based plans better align the incentives of outside directors with
shareholders. Controlling for these variables reduces the 124 ﬁrms with pension plans
to 99 observations. Forty-one terminate these pension plans in exchange for equity
compensation during the proxy season and 58 retain these plans. Finally, there
are sub-samples of ﬁrms where the board terminates outside director deﬁned beneﬁt
pensions unilaterally (n=22) and where the board formally discloses the change
in outside director compensation via a management resolution where shareholder
approval is required (n=19).
Proxy statements for each ﬁrm from the SEC’s EDGAR database are used
to obtain ﬁrm speciﬁc data, e.g., relevant director and board information, and to
identify whether the ﬁrm employed management resolutions in their decisions to alter
outside directors’ deferred compensation plans. Additional data on the ﬁrms and
their industries are obtained from Compustat, Securities and Data Corporation’s
Merger and Acquisition, Investor Rights Association of America (IRAA), and the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases.
4 Univariate results
We examine variables representing four general categories of explanatory inﬂuences
in the model for the existence of a deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan and the shift in outside
director compensation. Table 1 lists these representative variables used in previous
research as well as univariate tests for diﬀerences in means.6 The ﬁrst category
presented in Panel A is external pressure, which includes the potential inﬂuence
of institutional investors and shareholder rights groups as well as takeover activity
6 Due to the potential for a diﬀerence in the variances of the two samples, we ﬁrst test for a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the variance. On the basis of the signiﬁcance of this test we choose the appropriate t-statistic
using pooled variances or Satterthwaite’s adjusted t-statistic for unequal variances. The diﬀerence in
medians is tested for using the nonparametric Wilcoxon-sign test. Tests using medians provide qualitat-
ively the same results as tests of the means.
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in the industry, deﬁned by a two-digit SIC code.7 The objective in using the ﬁrst
three variables of share ownership, percent of shares owned by, and number of,
non-block institutions and percent shares owned by blockholders, is to reﬂect the
possibility that outside investors may have diﬀerent levels of inﬂuence. The latter is
measured as the percentage of dollars of takeover activity in a ﬁrm’s industry across
the sample for ﬁve years prior to the event year. The deﬁnition of takeover activity
used is similar to that of Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), where activity includes tender
oﬀers, mergers, leveraged buyouts, signiﬁcant sales of assets, signiﬁcant purchase of
assets, and major recapitalizations. Although ﬁrms with deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans
have a greater percentage of ownership by non-blockholder institutions, the owner-
ship is diluted over a signiﬁcantly greater number of institutions. Moreover, ﬁrms
with pension plans have a signiﬁcantly lower percentage of shares held by block-
holders. The primary external characteristic of those ﬁrms changing their compen-
sation systems is the signiﬁcantly higher likelihood of being a target of the IRAA.
There is greater takeover activity in the industries of ﬁrms with deﬁned beneﬁt
pensions for their outside directors consistent with the argument that these plans are
used as additional compensation to attract and retain. No signiﬁcant diﬀerence exists
between those ﬁrms that terminate or retain the pension plans. However, ﬁrms that
unilaterally terminate deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans are in industries with signiﬁcantly
less takeover activity than ﬁrms retaining directors’ plans.
The second category, presented in Panel B, is internal governance. These variables
suggest a mix in board governance eﬀectiveness. Previous research generally ﬁnds
that the lower percentage of representation by insiders on boards improves the po-
tential for an eﬀective board.8 On the other hand, the greater board size and likeli-
hood of the chief executive oﬃcer being the chairperson suggest the opposite. We ﬁnd
ﬁrms that never had an outside directors’ plan are more controlled by insiders, and
that inside directors make up a higher percentage of the board, have longer tenure,
and own a higher percentage of shares. Firms that have plans have larger boards,
fewer insiders, younger outside directors, shorter tenure for the CEO and insiders,
and the CEO is more likely to be the chairperson. Firms that terminate the plan have
fewer insiders and signiﬁcantly less insider stock ownership. Plan termination via a
management resolution is made by ﬁrms that have insiders with greater equity
holdings and outside directors that are signiﬁcantly younger and have a shorter
tenure.
The third category of explanatory variables in this study and reported in Panel C is
outside directors’ compensation. Firms with outside directors’ pension plans have
signiﬁcantly higher equity-based compensation, using signiﬁcantly more (less) re-
stricted stock (options), when compared to the sample of ﬁrms that never had a plan.
The use of these forms of compensation may be a mechanism to oﬀset potential
agency problems associated with the deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans. While ﬁrms
7 In our terminology, external pressure refers to the combined eﬀects of institutional investors, investor
rights advocates, and takeover risk. Other studies employ diﬀering deﬁnitions. For example, Cremers and
Nair (2003) refer to blockholders and board of directors as internal governance, while takeover likeli-
hood, or corporate control, is considered external governance.
8 We deﬁne inside directors as those currently employed full-time by the ﬁrm and outside directors as those
individuals who have no contracts and no previous employment with the company.
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Table 1. Means and univariate statistics for outside director compensation and hypothesized determinants
The sample consists of 169 ﬁrms followed by a large international consulting organization during the 1995–1996 proxy season. a From this list of ﬁrms,
one group of ﬁrms (No Plan) did not compensate outside directors with a deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan, while the other group (Plan) did. From the sub-
sample of ﬁrms (Plan) that used the deﬁned beneﬁt pension for outside directors, one group continued (Retain) the plan and the other group (Terminate)
terminated it in exchange for additional equity compensation for the outside directors.b Last, the Terminate sub-sample is divided into a group that
unilaterally terminates (No MR) the deﬁned beneﬁt pensions and one where the board formally discloses the change in outside director compensation
via a management resolution (MR).c T-statistics appear in parentheses.d
1 2 3 4 5 6
Variables No plan Plan Retain Terminate No MR MR
n=45 n=124 n=58 n=41 n=22 n=19
(Diﬀerence in means) (1–2) (3–4) (5–6)
Panel A: External pressure
Percent shares owned by non-block
institutions
55.96% 61.43%
(x1.95*)
61.28% 63.84%
(x0.81)
65.28% 62.18%
(0.60)
Number of institutional investors
(non-blockholders)
559.82 658.75
(x1.70*)
618.14 747.78
(x1.90*)
816.14 668.63
(1.47)
Percent shares owned by blockholders 16.22% 11.70%
(1.91*)
11.42% 11.06%
(0.12)
9.16% 13.27%
(x0.90)
IRAA Target 8.89% 11.29%
(x0.44)
6.90% 24.39%
(x2.51**)
22.73% 26.32%
(x0.26)
Percent dollar value of takeover
activity
2.93% 4.28%
(x1.83*)
4.24% 4.42%
(x0.19)
0.03% 0.06%
(x1.89*)
Panel B: Internal governance
Percent shares owned by inside
directors
6.95% 1.86%
(2.41**)
2.14% 0.46%
(2.32**)
0.35% 0.59%
(x2.06**)
Percent shares owned by outside directors 1.87% 0.84%
(0.91)
0.22% 1.77%
(x1.37)
0.11% 3.70%
(1.50)
Board size 10.96 12.08
(x2.81**)
11.62 12.32 12.59 12.00
(0.95)
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Table 1. (cont.)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Variables No plan Plan Retain Terminate No MR MR
n=45 n=124 n=58 n=41 n=22 n=19
(Diﬀerence in means) (1–2) (3–4) (5–6)
Percent inside directors 29.35% 20.68%
(4.07***)
22.41% 18.13%
(2.29**)
19.20% 16.90%
(0.90)
Percent outside directors 65.62% 73.99%
(x3.88***)
72.50% 74.91%
(x1.01)
73.53% 76.52%
(x0.83)
CEO is Chairperson 68.89% 91.13%
(x2.99***)
91.38% 92.68%
(x0.23)
90.91% 94.74%
(x0.46)
Tenure of CEO (years) 14.64 9.63
(3.18***)
10.52 8.27
(1.67*)
9.91 6.37
(1.91*)
Tenure of inside directors (years) 13.45 9.75
(3.75***)
10.35 8.68
(1.59)
9.13 8.15
(0.63)
Tenure of outside directors (years) 8.33 8.35
(x0.05)
8.36 8.47
(x0.24)
9.25 7.57
(2.79***)
Age of outside directors 62.07 60.65
(2.08**)
60.91 60.89
(0.05)
61.52 60.16
(2.01**)
Panel C: Outside director compensatione
Total retainer (1995) $28,447 $30,434 $29,821 $31,576 $34,601 $28,026
(x0.92) (x1.68) (1.59)
Total retainer (1996) $29,821 $36,246 $36,732 $35,683
(x2.18**) (0.20)
Percent retainer equity based (1995) 5.19% 11.90% 7.43% 20.98% 21.01% 20.79%
(x1.95**) (x2.48**) (0.02)
Percent retainer equity based (1996) 6.99% 38.75% 31.37% 47.29%
(x5.11***) (x1.36)
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Restricted stock 31.11% 68.55% 63.79% 80.49% 95.45% 63.16%
(x4.61***) (x1.81**) (2.64**)
Stock options 55.56% 32.52% 33.33% 26.83% 9.09% 47.37%
(2.76***) (0.68) (x2.87***)
Panel D: Economic determinants
Log of sales in 1995 8.50 8.92
(x2.17**)
8.79 9.21
(x1.99**)
9.27 9.15
(0.38)
Market–to-book (1995) 2.88 3.67
(x2.06**)
3.80 4.01
(x0.26)
3.36 4.81
(x1.36)
Property, plant & equipment/sales 77.06% 101.00%
(x1.54)
103.16% 87.80%
(0.84)
94.86% 79.63%
(0.59)
Return on assets
(EBITDA/Total Assets)
4.73% 5.44%
(x0.82)
5.69% 5.77%
(x0.09)
6.12% 5.33%
(0.60)
Standard deviation
(EBITDA/Total Assets)
2.59% 2.16%
(0.75)
2.07% 2.28%
(x0.45)
1.96% 2.68%
(x0.89)
Stock returns (1993–1995) (daily)
(includes dividends)
0.06% 0.07%
(x1.23)
0.06% 0.07%
(x0.16)
0.06% 0.07%
(0.78)
Volatility of daily stock returns
(1993–1995)
1.84% 1.55%
(2.95***)
1.55% 1.48%
(0.71)
1.47% 1.50%
(x0.33)
a Six proxy mailings and stockholder meetings are in 1995. Of the ﬁnal sample of 169, 93.49% of the proxies are mailed during February through April of
1996 with corresponding stockholders’ meetings taking place during February through June of 1996. Five proxies are mailed later in 1996 with one
stockholder meeting occurring in January of 1997.
b Restricting the sample to ﬁrms that have a quid-pro-quo exchange of outside directors’ deﬁned beneﬁt plans for equity compensation and ﬁrms that did
not simultaneously alter top executive and outside director incentive plans during the proxy season reduces the 124 ﬁrms with pension plans to 99.
c ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
d Due to the potential for a diﬀerence in the variances of the two samples, we ﬁrst test for a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the variance. On the basis of a 10
percent signiﬁcance level of this test we choose the appropriate t-statistic using pooled variances or Satterthwaite’s adjusted t-statistic for unequal
variances.
e The ﬁgures in this panel are from the 1995 proxies unless otherwise noted.
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terminating the deﬁned beneﬁt pension pay their outside directors a signiﬁcantly
higher retainer, they required directors to have a signiﬁcantly higher percentage of the
retainer in the form of equity compensation, with a signiﬁcantly greater use of
restricted stock, prior to the decision. The increase in the percentage of the retainer
required to be in equity increases from roughly 21% to 39% and 47% for ﬁrms
not using management resolutions and those that do, respectively. The use of the
management resolution may reﬂect the desire to prevent any concerns regarding
self-dealing by the board.9
Our last category of explanatory variables, reported in Panel D, is economic
variables. We employ economic and ﬁrm performance variables similar to those
that have been used by Core, Holthausen, and Larker (1999) and others. Firms with
deﬁned beneﬁt pensions for their outside directors tend to be larger, measured as the
log of 1995 sales. The higher market-to-book ratio of ﬁrms with deﬁned beneﬁt
pension plans may reﬂect market power or growth opportunities with the lower
volatility of stock returns suggesting market power. For ﬁrms shifting their outside
director compensation, the only signiﬁcant economic variable is log of sales, which
shows that these ﬁrms are larger than those electing to stay with deﬁned beneﬁt
pension plans. Disclosure of the decision to terminate the outside directors’ pension
plan via management resolution is not explained by the economic determinants
described in Table 1.
5 Logistic regression results
We estimate through logit analysis the probability that ﬁrms can be categorized into
one of the classiﬁcations deﬁned by our sub-sample of ﬁrms and what characteristics
are signiﬁcant in correctly classifying ﬁrms according to these groups. The logit
regression results are supportive of the univariate analysis.10 We also test for the
determinants of eﬀective board monitoring by examining the ﬁrm’s decision to alter
outside director compensation from a deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan to a compensation
system with increased equity. The question is whether we can explain this shift in
compensation within the context of economic, external pressure, and/or governance
determinants.
9 The compensation committee is typically composed of outside directors. Thus there may be a conﬂict of
interest in the determination of the value of the pension plan in terms of its equity-based incentive
equivalent. Usually compensation is considered an issue of ordinary business and does not need share-
holder approval. However, the Delaware Chancellory Court, among other courts, make an exception in
the case of a self-dealing situation. The situation of outside directors determining their own compensation
may be just such a situation. As a result of using a management resolution not only is more information
revealed in the proxy but every investor’s attention is drawn to the change in outside director compen-
sation. Thus, we would expect that ﬁrms that formally change the compensation system through a proxy
vote are not only making a very public statement but may also be protecting themselves against any
charges of self-dealing.
10 In the determination of the logistic analysis presented in this section, several diﬀerent models were run.
Additional variables consistently remained insigniﬁcant across models; for example the use of restricted
stock or stock options. Furthermore, with the exception of those tests speciﬁcally mentioned, chi-square
tests of one model against another indicated no signiﬁcant improvement over the model presented in
Table 2. Additional variables increase the multicollinearity and reduce the power of the model tested.
Hence, in the interest of brevity and relevance to the issues focused on in this paper, these results are not
formally presented.
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Pension plan versus no pension plan
The logit regression presented in the ﬁrst column of Table 2 for ﬁrms with and
without deﬁned beneﬁt plans for outside directors indicates the model correctly
classiﬁes 67.51% (p-value%0) of the ﬁrms. Similar to the univariate results,
ﬁrms with deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans for outside directors have a signiﬁcantly
greater percentage of the ﬁrms’ shares owned by institutions. These plans are
more likely to be used when the tenure of inside directors is shorter and outside
directors are younger. This is consistent with the human resource argument that
deﬁned beneﬁt pensions can be used to attract, retain, and retire high-quality
employees. The chief executive oﬃcer is also more likely to be the chairman of
the board when there is a deﬁned beneﬁt plan. However, ﬁrms that reward out-
side directors with a deﬁned beneﬁt pension are more likely to require that a
greater percentage of the retainer be used to purchase some form of the ﬁrm’s
equity. Thus, there appears to be an attempt to oﬀset any potential agency conﬂict
by requiring a larger percentage of outside director compensation to be invested
in equity.
Terminate versus retain pension plan decision
The logit regression presented in the second column of Table 2 for ﬁrms terminating
a deﬁned beneﬁt pension for outside directors and ﬁrms that do not indicates the
model correctly classiﬁes 56.17% (p-value%0) of the ﬁrms. We ﬁnd ﬁrms are more
likely to shift from a deﬁned beneﬁt pension to equity compensation when faced with
greater external pressure based on the greater probability that the ﬁrm is targeted by
the IRAA. These companies being externally pressured to switch the compensation
plan have larger boards and a greater percentage of the outside directors’ retainer
must be invested in a form of corporate equity.
To test for the relative contribution of the four explanatory variable categories
in Table 2, we test whether certain categories of variables signiﬁcantly improve
the overall model. Given the signiﬁcance of the external pressure variables, we
test whether internal governance (including outside director compensation) and
ﬁrm economic determinants signiﬁcantly add explanatory power to the model.
The chi-square statistic for adding the governance variables is 49.29 (p-value%0)
indicating these variables do add power to the external pressure variables. The
chi-square statistic for adding the variables in the economic category is 1.84
(p-value=0.996), indicating they do not add explanatory power to the model. Hence,
we conclude that external pressure, internal governance structure, and the percent of
outside directors’ equity-based compensation in the retainer are signiﬁcant factors
in determining the probability of whether outside directors’ compensation will shift
from a deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan to greater equity compensation.
Management resolution decision
The change in outside director compensation suggested by the compensation com-
mittee is either unilaterally changed at the board level or voted on by shareholders
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Table 2. Logistic regression results for changes in the structure of outside
directors’ compensation
The ﬁrst logistic regression is standard. The three right columns report results from generalized
logistic regressions. Hence, the regression between those ﬁrms retaining versus terminating
outside director deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans is conditional on the ﬁrm having such a plan. The
reference group is ﬁrms without a pension plan. The terminate sub-sample is divided into a
group that unilaterally terminates (No MR) the deﬁned beneﬁt pensions and a group where
the board formally discloses the change in outside director compensation via a management
resolution (MR). The estimates for the two groups are simultaneously estimated conditional
on the plan being terminated. The reference group is ﬁrms retaining the pension plan.a
Variables
Plan versus
no plan
Terminate
versus
retain plan
No MR
versus
retain plan
MR versus
retain plan
Intercept 7.49 0.99 x9.48 11.03
External pressure
Percentage shares owned by
non-block institutions
6.43*** 4.77 3.88 5.16
Percentage shares owned by blockholders 0.90 0.80 2.06 1.94
Acquisition activity 17.55* x7.84 x32.18* 7.85
IRAA target – 2.60** 3.93** 1.04
Internal Governance
Percentage shares owned by inside directors 1.65 x62.69 x472.10** x23.03
Board size 0.19* 0.37* 0.45* 0.32
Percentage of inside directors x3.86 x3.21 2.50 x6.16
Mean tenure of inside directors (years) x0.08* x0.02 0.02 x0.02
Mean age of outside directors (years) x0.21** x0.17 x0.01 x0.34*
CEO is Chairperson 1.91*** 0.26 0.33 x1.10
Outside director compensationb
Total retainer x0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Percentage of retainer equity based 3.18** 5.00*** 4.66*** 5.41***
Economic determinants
EBITDA 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00
Sales x0.00 x0.00 x0.00* x0.00
Market to book equity value 0.07 x0.00 x0.05 0.00
Property plant and equipment to sales 0.22 x0.11 x0.81 x0.06
Standard deviation of ROA
(EBITDA/Total Assets)
x0.08 x0.02 x0.57 0.13
Stock returns (1993–1995)
(including dividends)
0.71 1.03 1.10 0.66
Standard deviation of stock
returns (1993–1995)
x49.92 46.16 93.37 39.82
Number of observations 158c 99 80 78
Likelihood ratio 67.51 56.17 85.51d
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)d
a ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
b This variable is calculated using 1995 proxies for the No Plan and Plan samples. The Retain, Terminate,
NoMR andMR samples use 1996 proxies to calculate the percentage of retainer that is equity based. Using
only 1995 proxy ﬁgures does not materially aﬀect the models or conclusions.
c The sample size declines from 169 to 158 due to the requirement that there are no missing variables.
d There is only one likelihood ratio and p-value because both sub-samples are conditioned on one reference
category, i.e., ﬁrms retaining the pension plans.
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as a management resolution.11 Regardless of the method used to terminate the
deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans, ﬁrms terminating plans require a higher percentage of
equity-based compensation for outside directors when compared to ﬁrms retaining
the plans. Conditional on terminating the plan, determinants of the choice of using
a management resolution or changing the plan unilaterally are tested in the latter
two columns of Table 2. A generalized logit12 is used with the sample retaining plans
deﬁned as the reference group for the two methods of terminating the pension plan.
Each category is contrasted against the reference category. For example, conditional
on having a pension plan, the analysis determines what variables are signiﬁcant in
the decision of how to terminate the pension plan.
Unlike ﬁrms that directly communicate the change to stockholders via a manage-
ment resolution, ﬁrms unilaterally terminating the plans are more likely to be
IRAA targets relative to ﬁrms retaining the plans. Similar to the terminate-retain
analysis, we test the signiﬁcance of the variable categories being added to the model.
Speciﬁcally, we examine whether internal governance, including outside director
compensation, and ﬁrm economic determinants add power to the model with just
external pressure. The chi-square statistic for adding the internal governance
variables is 37.24 (p-value%0.000) indicating the internal governance variables add
explanatory value just as in the terminate-retain model. The chi-square statistic
for the incremental addition of ﬁrm economic variables is 11.09 (p-value=0.679),
reinforcing the lack of signiﬁcance of the economic variables in the decision to
terminate or the method of termination, of deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans.
Shareholder activism may be a mechanism to get a ‘ foot in the door’ to create a
dialog with management as a way to encourage changes within the company. The
results here suggest that, when ﬁrms are pressured by groups representing investors
such as the IRAA, management or outside board members propose to unilaterally
terminate the deﬁned beneﬁt pension. The decision by ﬁrms targeted by IRAA not
to seek a shareholder vote may reﬂect a close level of contact this organization has
with targeted ﬁrm management. This contact may mitigate the threat of a share-
holder resolution, which is voided when management agrees to acquiesce to the
IRAA request. This form of action is evident in the letters from management we
obtained from the IRAA.13
6 Empirical results of stock return and accounting performance measures
In the univariate and logit analyses, measures of stock return and accounting
performance are included. In this section more speciﬁc and direct tests of the stock
return and accounting performance measures are conducted.
11 The SEC has ruled that shareholder votes have value and institutional shareholders are required to vote
the shares held or be considered derelict in their duties. Thus, as a result of using a management resol-
ution not only is more information revealed in the proxy but every institutional investor knows of the
removal of the plan.
12 For an overview of generalized logit analysis, see Agresti, Categorical Data Analysis, John Wiley & Sons
(1990).
13 Examples include excerpts from letters to the IRAA that announce the targeted ﬁrm is unilaterally
withdrawing its deﬁned beneﬁt pension: ‘Based on this letter, you will fax me your letter withdrawing
your shareholder proposal ’ (Sunoco); ‘I appreciate your willingness to withdraw your proposal based
on our conversation and this letter’ (Westinghouse Electric Corporation).
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Table 3. Tests of signiﬁcant excess stock return and accounting performance
The performance benchmark is the sample ﬁrm’s median stock return or accounting
performance measure for ﬁrms in the sample ﬁrm’s industry deﬁned by the two-digit SIC code.
One group of ﬁrms (No plan) did not compensate outside directors with a deﬁned beneﬁt
pension plan, while the other group (Plan) did. From the sub-sample of ﬁrms (Plan) that used
the deﬁned beneﬁt pension for outside directors, one group continued (Retain) the plan and
the other group (Terminate) terminated it in exchange for additional equity compensation for
the outside directors. The ‘Terminate ’ sub-sample is divided into a group that unilaterally
terminates (No MR) the deﬁned beneﬁt pensions and one where the board formally discloses
the change in outside director compensation via a management resolution (MR).a
Panel A: Average excess stock returns relative to a sample ﬁrm’s industry.b Calendar years
are used.
Sample
Average excess return (t-statistic)
1993–1995 1996–1998
1996–1998
less
1993–1995
Plan x0.04% 0.00% 0.04%
(x2.79)*** (0.06) (2.11)**
No plan 0.05% x0.00% x0.05%
(2.75)*** (x0.01) (x1.86)*
Terminate x0.03% 0.05% 0.08%
(x1.60) (1.81)* (2.65)**
Retain x0.04% x0.03% 0.02%
(x2.28)** (x1.35) (0.65)
MR x0.03% 0.01% x0.05%
(x0.99) (0.25) (0.77)
No MR x0.04% 0.05% 0.09%
(x1.61) (1.48) (2.84)***
Panel B: Average excess accounting returns relative to a sample ﬁrm’s industry.c Fiscal years
are used.
Sample
Average excess accounting performance measure (t-statistic)
1993–1995 1996–1998
1996–1998
less
1993–1995
Plan ROA 4.00% 4.78% 0.79%
(6.33)*** (6.81)*** (2.72)***
ROE 0.30% 0.27% x0.02%
(8.43)*** (6.78)*** (x0.71)
No Plan ROA 1.67% 2.06% 0.38%
(2.20)** (2.24)** (0.60)
ROE 0.20% 0.12% x0.08%
(3.34)*** (4.31)*** (x1.29)
Terminate ROA 3.86% 4.87% 1.02%
(3.78)*** (4.04)*** (2.17)**
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Two three-year periods are deﬁned. The ﬁrst period is the three calendar years
prior to the proxy season and the second period is the three subsequent calendar
years. Three measures of performance are used. The market-based return measure
is the average excess return of the ﬁrm’s equity over the period, where the excess
return is deﬁned as the actual ﬁrm return minus the return of the median ﬁrm in the
sample ﬁrm’s industry deﬁned by a two-digit SIC code. Similarly, the two accounting
performance measures, ROA (EBITDA/Total Assets) and ROE (EBITDA/Common
Shares), are the average of the sample ﬁrm’s respective performance measure,
i.e. ROA, less the sample ﬁrm’s two-digit SIC code industry median performance of
that measure.14,15 The results are presented in Table 3 with Panel A presenting stock
return performance and Panel B accounting measure performance. Firms with a
pension plan have signiﬁcantly negative average excess returns during the 1993–1995
period, while ﬁrms without pension plans have signiﬁcantly positive average excess
returns during the same time period. Firms terminating the pension plans during
Table 3. (cont.)
Panel B: (cont.).
Sample
Average excess accounting performance measure (t-statistic)
1993–1995 1996–1998
1996–1998
less
1993–1995
ROE 0.29% 0.30% 0.00%
(5.37)*** (7.59)*** (0.07)
Retain ROA 4.09% 4.72% 0.64%
(5.05)*** (5.48)*** (1.73)*
ROE 0.30% 0.25% x0.04%
(6.47)*** (4.18)*** (x0.96)
MR ROA 3.74% 5.64% 1.91%
(2.33)** (3.12)*** (3.53)***
ROE 0.26% 0.41% 0.15%
(6.42)*** (5.94)*** (3.00)***
No MR ROA 3.93% 4.40% 0.43%
(2.93)*** (2.72)** (0.62)
ROE 0.31% 0.22% x0.09%
(3.67)*** (5.35)*** (x1.01)
a ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
b Stock returns are adjusted for distributions, stock splits, and dividends.
c ROA is EBITDA/Total Assets and ROE is EBITDA/Common Shares. Other deﬁnitions
result in qualitatively the same results.
14 In the calculation of the industry median benchmark the sample ﬁrm is excluded.
15 Clarke (1989) shows the two-digit SIC deﬁnition captures ﬁrms’ similarities as well as three- and four-
digit deﬁnitions.
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the 1995–1996 proxy season have a signiﬁcant increase in stock return performance
from the 1993–1995 to the 1996–1998 period, while those ﬁrms keeping the pension
plans do not; although in the latter period ﬁrms keeping the pension plans no
longer have signiﬁcantly negative excess returns.16 In Panel B, where the accounting
performance measures are reported, every sample of ﬁrms in both periods perform
signiﬁcantly above the respective medians in their two-digit SIC code industry
for both measures, ROA and ROE. There is some signiﬁcant improvement in
accounting measures of performance from the 1993–1995 to 1996–1998 period in
the plan, terminate and MR samples. More speciﬁcally, the sample terminating
the pension plan through a management resolution has signiﬁcant improvement in
both the ROA and ROE performance measures. This is also the sample with the
greatest increase in the percentage of the retainer required to be invested in equity
(21% to 47%).
The stock return performance during the period prior to the 1995–1996 proxy
season indicates institutional investors and investor rights groups could associate
pension plans as providing a disincentive for outside directors to have their interests
aligned with shareholders. Given accounting performance measures indicate superior
performance, the institutional investors and investor rights group appear to be
focused on stock return performance and not accounting performance measures.
There is a signiﬁcant increase in the stock return performance of those ﬁrms termin-
ating the pension plans for a quid-pro-quo increase in equity compensation, which
is not observed for those ﬁrms retaining pension plans. This ﬁnding supports the
contention made by some investors that deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans for outside
directors misaligns outside directors’ interests with management.
7 Summary and conclusions
Considerable research on the governance structure of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms focuses on
the role of the board of directors as a monitoring body assumed to have interests
aligned with stockholders. However, the eﬀectiveness of the board of directors has
been increasingly questioned by various parties including NASDAQ, NYSE, and
the SEC. One form of compensation for outside directors has been deﬁned beneﬁt
pension plans. The quid-pro-quo exchange of these plans for more equity compen-
sation for outside directors allows testing whether the compensation structure
for outside directors is not only commensurate with this goal of alignment with
shareholders’ interests, but also leads to eﬀective governance of the ﬁrm measured in
terms of operating and/or market-related ﬁrm performance.
We provide insight into the role of external pressure in aﬀecting the relation
between ﬁrm internal governance and managerial decision making. Our results
indicate that ﬁrms with outside director pension plans were using equity as an
alignment tool, but were still pressured to terminate the plans. External pressure
in the form of investor rights groups (IRAA) and internal governance and not
16 All ﬁrms in our sample terminated their outside director deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans by 1999, consistent
with outside directors’ incentives changing over the subsequent years to be more aligned with equity
holders.
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takeover risk and/or institutional shareholders provides the force for this change in
compensation. Firms with pension plans underperform their industry in terms of
stock return performance. Based on our results, when a sample of ﬁrms are driven by
external pressure to terminate deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans for outside directors
in favor of increased equity compensation, ﬁrm stock performance improves signiﬁ-
cantly. Our ﬁndings show that terminating outside director pension plans improved
governance eﬀectiveness of outside directors. This is evidenced by the signiﬁcant
stock return underperformance of ﬁrms with pension plans and the signiﬁcant
increase in equity returns subsequent to the quid-pro-quo substitution of equity-
based compensation in lieu of deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans.
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